Introduction
There has never been a British Foreign Legion. inhabited by Arabs and Jews, and made wonderful by the stories of the Bible and the tales of the Thousand and One Nights. 3 As one police officer described it, 'the dark secrets and murders and every other crime peculiar to the east will I am afraid never be known.' 4 The men discursively cultivated an image of a curious, exotic posting for raffish types after adventure. 'The British Empire did not have a Foreign Legion, but it did have the Palestine police which shared something of the arduous way of life of that famed French Corps,' was how Ted Horne, the force's historian and a former Palestine policeman, put it many years later. 5 James Tait was a grammar school boy who wanted to join the French Foreign Legion but lacked the funds to make the journey to Marseilles and so joined the Palestine police after seeing an advertisement in the Daily Telegraph. 6 One Palestine policeman had been in the French Foreign Legion and opined that it was 'cushy' by comparison to service in Palestine; a 'Legion of the Lost' was how another policeman described his time in Palestine in the 1920s. 7 
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The public stories of the men who went to Palestine are those of soldiers in other armies, filled with adventure, masculinity and the cosh of tough drill sergeants, all willingly endured -what has been termed the 'masculine ideal' in the context of the US Marine Corps. 8 'It was like being in a concentration camp, enjoyable, but you never stopped from dawn to dusk' was Reuben Kitson's recollection of the Palestine police recruits' depot on Mount Scopus, one run on military lines and staffed by Guards drill staff. 9 Filled with old soldiers' tales of the Great War, men at a loose end in the bleak times of the Depression and who wanted 'fresh air and adventure' -'I was in a dead end job,' remembered Geoffrey Morton -sought escape in a new, even tougher life. 10 Any nascent mythology of a British Foreign Legion in Palestine has long since evaporated. We do not remember these men as they saw themselves, as British legionnaires. But like the French Foreign Legion, the Palestine police attracted former soldiers, initially from the British paramilitary 'Black and Tans' force used against Irish rebels in the early 1920s, a force that established the basis for police forces across Britain's colonies. 11 Later on, regular demobilized soldiers went out to Palestine, right up to when the Palestine police was disbanded in 1948. 12 Until 1930, the Crown Agents in London only recruited ex-Servicemen for the Palestine Police. 13 The Palestine police was paramilitary in style, equipped and trained on military lines, and it served alongside the Army. It also attracted men who were in some real or imagined sense on the margins of society, like the recruits for the French Foreign Legion. Thus, in the 1930s, the Inspector-General of the police attempted to broaden and improve his force by recruiting men of 'reasonable education' who would help weed out the 'unsuitable' ones, 'guilty' of 'misbehaviour.' 14 This was a 'crack force' -the expression used in recruitment posters in the 1940s -by which was meant a tough, elite unit for men who would not shy away from the violence inherent in colonial control. The men were 'ruthless,' 'arrogant' and, like the soldiers of the French Foreign Legion, they drank heavily. 18 This continued in Palestine, men 'drinking deeply,' so deeply that on one occasion off-duty police officers were lucky to escape a grenade attack on the bar in which they were drinking -a more sober soldier with them having the foresight to hurl the device back out in to the roadafter which police officers 'thrashed' every Arab they saw. 'The last thing I remember is unhitching a cart horse and racing someone on a donkey down the main street,' recalled a policeman at the scene. 19 'Black and tan methods' was the neologism used to describe the brutality of the police force in Palestine; the 'third degree' or 'gentle persuasion' were other euphemisms for a system that hid violence behind the fig leaf of language. 20 British clergy in Palestine wrote of how they were 'seriously troubled at the "Black and Tan" methods of the police,' adding that they could do little to stop what was happening. 21 Soldiers and police 'turned the blind eye,' 'bumping off' suspects who were 'shot trying to escape' -all of which 'saved a lot of trouble.' 22 Gasps and mumbles can be heard during the last comment in a later oral history recording by police office Geoffrey Morton -a combination one suspects of bad memories and old age.
The machismo of the police was comical, such as when policeman Sydney Burr received a handkerchief from home, after which he was forced to write back (rather absurdly), I am afraid I will not be able to use it here, the old Black and Tans who were the beginning of this force do not look upon such effeminate apparel in a kindly light. They think the force is going to the dogs as it is. It is because of the soft ways that are creeping into the police that the Arabs are so defiant. 23 The police were more violent than British soldiers, Army commanders having to issue 'stringent orders against harshness and unnecessary violence' to prevent police brutality spreading to the troops. 24 When Palestinian fighter Bahjat Abu Gharbiyah recounted to this author his memories of being tortured by the police -a story inflected by a different narrative, that of Palestinian nationalism -he singled out the police and not the Army as using pre-meditated brutality. 25 The Army was less bad, simply wrecking villages and shooting people. Soldiers had better discipline, lived away from local people and only served temporarily in the country during times of trouble when the police could not cope. The Royal Ulster Rifles, a hard-charging regiment that knew all about punitive operations ('they weren't shy of doing some violence,' including at the Arab village of al-Bassa), wrote to the High Commissioner complaining about the brutality of the police. British policeman in charge at the 'Gestapo' methods being used, he was told ….that force was the only language these Arabs understood. Under Turkish rule they had been brought up to respect such methods. 'Where do you think we would get,' he asked me 'if we questioned them like a London bobby? I'll tell you; the police methods would be laughed at, we should get no results, and our methods would be regarded as a sign of weakness.' 'In these interrogations,' he went on, 'I make it a rule never to beat anyone up myself. I let Arab police beat up Arabs, and Jewish police beat up Jews.' 30 British police officers absorbed 'Turkish ways,' accepting them as the cultural norm in a colonial setting, and by using local police to torture local people the British exacerbated the embedded brutality of the Ottoman period, making it officially acceptable, but now set within a much better organized and more efficient Britishrun colonial state. In prison, the British would get Jewish guards to beat Arab suspects and vice versa, spreading the idea of acceptable levels of official violence. 31 The British 'ordered' Arab policemen to carry out torture. 
Racism
The racism that underpinned colonialism contributed both to normalising and casualizing violence by the police. Thus, policeman Douglas Duff, recalled the effects of a rifle-butt beating delivered by a colleague to an Arab in the 1920s: ….our attitude was that of Britons of the Diamond Jubilee era, to us all nonEuropeans were 'wogs,' and Western non-Britons only slightly more worthy.
When one of the Nablus detachment produced an old cigarette tin containing the brains of a man whose skull he had splintered with his rifle butt….I felt physically sick….the sight of that grog-blossomed face of the gendarme with his can half-full of human brains proudly brandishing his smashed rifle-butt as proof of his prowess, altered something inside of me; people who owned skins other than pink Western ones became human beings. 37 Duff put it simply when talking about a Muslim Palestinian crowd disturbance in 1922: 'Had our Arabic been better we might have sympathised with them; though I doubt it, for most of us were so infected by the sense of our own superiority over "lesser breeds" that we scarcely regarded these people as human.' for day-to-day policing; it relied on the Jews or the armed forces for much of its intelligence gathering; in times of riot and rebellion it failed in its job, necessitating the deployment of the British Army. 40 Reliant on locally recruited Arab officers for so much of what it did, the police suffered greatly in times of rebellion when these officers, in fear of their lives at the hands of rebels, deserted en masse. British police officers could (and did) rely on Jewish officers for local knowledge but both Jewish and Arab officers leaked intelligence to their respective communities and were never fully reliable. 41 The Inspector-General of the Palestine police struggled to modernize the force in the 1930s, trying to establish proper police methods, to get educated recruits and obtain better intelligence through a reformed CID branch, the subject of recent studies. 42 In the end, the Palestine police was neither an efficient police force nor an elite fighting force and, as the force struggled in its mission, it became frustrated and more brutal.
In times of peace, the police functioned by getting the Arab and Jewish officers to do the policing, using whatever violence was necessary; in increasingly turbulent times, morale and discipline collapsed as, without support, British police officers could not keep order, and failure manifested itself in violence, drunkenness and looting. 43 This meant that the Colonial Office called in the Army, further delegitimizing the police.
Hastily trained British police replacements rushed out to Palestine to replace lost Arab officers in times of revolt had no knowledge of local cultures or language. 44 As stated earlier, the disorder was such that the Army feared that police behaviour would infect the soldiers: 'Some of the police started running amok a bit in the bazaar and breaking things up in a most wanton manner. No doubt they have an awful lot of provocation for behaving like that but the whole proceeding was rather revolting and a very bad example to the troops.' 45 The Army was unimpressed with it all and when it came to the help of the police in 1936 during a major Arab revolt, one Brigade commander remarked that the police did not know what they were, 'mock soldiers -neither soldiers nor policemen.' 46 No better than 'second class' was how another Army Brigade commander described the police in a letter to his wife. 47 Fighting, looting, robbery, destruction, torture, and death squads became the order of the day, a far cry from their romantic image of a foreign legion (but, ironically, very much like the reality of life in the French Foreign Legion).
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This is not to say that all policemen were thugs -they were not -more that the ethos of their institution coupled to the practicalities of day-to-day policing resulted in extreme forms of coercion. Police violence towards women seems to have been limited, in some fashion. 'Know all about that. The man was a gangster, and had to be killed', or words to that effect. The clerk remonstrated, saying that if he was a gangster he should be properly tried and convicted, to which the constable replied, 'No, it's better to kill him like this', or words to that effect. 58 Andrawus, the garage owner, fled to Beirut, fearful of being killed by the police as a material witness. His family and friends had urged him not to appear as a witness, 'as it might cost him his life.' Woods delete the 's' -it's Wood not Woods had had 'the comparative decency to administer the "coup de grace" to the poor wretch whose bowels were protruding from wounds in the back' and he paid the judicial price as it was his pistol that delivered the final shot, leaving him accused of the most serious charge. 62 The colonial Government had neutered the '….we have carried out our orders.' Later a police officer arrived, ostensibly to take statements. He explained that the victim had tried to escape through the window….It should be noted that, 'Shot while trying to escape,' or, 'Shot while breaking the cordon' is a daily announcement in this country. Most, or many, of these incidents are 'bumpings-off' -nothing more or less. 71 According to Lees, the target for the police was a man who was one of the principal witnesses against a British police Sergeant and a Jewish Advocate who were to be tried for conspiracy and the taking and giving of bribes to facilitate illegal Jewish immigration. 72 Police violence was not just about political assassinations; criminality by officers played its part and low-level theft from civilians by police was an endemic problem in Palestine. 73 The events at Manshiya and the Dajani hospital establish that there were police death squads, a 'dirty war' in Palestine, euphemistically called 'special squads.' When back in London, Lees met a former constable of the Palestine police who told him that the man shot in Manshiya had first been tortured and then taken out to be killed:
….he had actually heard the British C.I.D. Sergeant concerned give the order to his 'Special Squad' to take the prisoner out and shoot him ('Take him for a ride' were the actual words), after repeated floggings had failed to elicit from him whatever information it was the Sergeant desired. 74 Lees was told by friends not to return to Palestine as his life was under threat, advice that he heeded. 75 This was not new, such things being called 'assassination direction' in Ireland, after which the 'hidden hand' protected those involved in breaking the law. As one war veteran remarked, he and his comrades did 'not want to remember the bad stuff,' a sentiment applicable not just to perpetrators but also to victims, one imagines, and one reason it is so hard to uncover the truth of some histories. intoxicants (morphine, cocaine and heroin), there were electric shocks, water was funnelled into suspects' stomachs and there were mock executions. 
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The Jews who had served under the British set up the Israeli state apparatus in 1948.
Their attitudes mirrored those of the British before them, under whom they had served, made worse by Jewish settlement and State-building, a project that required the removal or subjugation of recalcitrant local Arabs. As a Jewish doctor in Mandate Palestine told a British Army officer serving out in the country, the 'Turks' had not only been much tougher and much better at controlling the Arabs but also that 'the Arabs understood the lash and expected the lash. And the harder you treat them the better they will behave'. 105 The doctor added, 'And there's no doubt that the British have never I think really been harsh.' 106 The new regime of Jewish order in the country was to be even tougher -certainly more efficient in what it did -and run by people with an intimate knowledge and understandable dislike of the local nonJewish population who blocked the path to the creation of a Jewish State. Familiarity bred contempt, as it did for the police; the Army's temporary rotations through Palestine by regiments softened any hostility: 'I think we British rather admire the Arabs,' was one Army officer's far from isolated comment. 107 As colonists, the Israelis after 1948 adopted British imperial policies in their dealings with the Arabsthe British were, after all, experts in such things -instituting collective punishments and abusing the local Arabs, often in the same torture centres established under the Mandate Government. 
